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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a case study in the application of for-
mal modelling and verification techniques to a large-scale
distributed operating system for Grids called XtreemOS.
The process algebraic language of applied pi-calculus is used
to model one of the mutual authentication protocols in the
XtreemOS trust model, and an associated tool called ProVerif
is used to verify the data leakage and mutual authentication
properties in the protocol. The results, beside enhancing
the level of assurance of the protocol in a critical part of the
system, contribute to better understanding of the level of
detail in the protocol’s specification hence enabling better
implementation of the protocol.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verifi-
cation—formal methods; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Se-
curity and Protection—verification
General Terms
Design, Security, Theory, Verification
Keywords
formal analysis, trust, Grid systems, operating systems
1. INTRODUCTION
The management of trust in large-scale distributed sys-
tems, such as Grids, is a complex process, which requires
various mechanisms and techniques to adapt to the individ-
ual components in the system without compromising various
security requirements and assurances. Such mechanisms and
techniques may include personal vetting, cryptographic cre-
dentials and security protocols for the purpose of authen-
ticating communicating entities. Traditionally, the use of
formal modelling and verification was adopted to obtain rig-
orous understanding of the properties that hold in a security
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protocol [6, 8, 17, 24, 25, 7, 4, 27, 5]. However, by its very
nature, formal verification is an expensive process and re-
quires a high level of expertise. Therefore, its application
within a complex computing system should preferably be
confined to the parts that are considered to be critical.
The work presented in this paper is one example of such
use of formal verification techniques in enhancing the as-
surance about the level of trust in a large-scale Grid-based
distributed operating system, called XtreemOS [12, 23]. A
process algebraic methodology, called applied pi-calculus [2],
and its associated tool, ProVerif [7] are applied to the mod-
elling and verification of a mutual authentication protocol,
which is used to establish trusted communications between
users and resources in an XtreemOS Grid. As a result, the
main significance of this work can be expressed in terms of
the following two major contributions:
• A critical part of the XtreemOS trust model as de-
fined by one of its mutual authentication protocols is
formally verified in light of desireable security proper-
ties for that protocol, therefore increasing its level of
assurance within the system.
• As a result of the formal modelling of the protocol,
extra detail is added to the original informal specifi-
cation, which facilitates the implementation stage fol-
lowing the specification.
The formal verification work presented in this paper was
part of a larger effort in project XtreemOS for applying for-
mal methods to the improvement of certain parts of the
system and at different stages of the development lifecy-
cle. Other examples included [3, 5]. In [5], the application
of formal analysis was applied to another protocol in the
project for achieving delegation of trust between users and
resources. The analysis uncovered various flaws in the origi-
nal protocol. In [3], formal modelling of some of the security
requirements in XtreemOS was used to consolidate their un-
derstanding and better direct the design process.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section
2 we provide a general overview of the architecture of the
XtreemOS operating system. In Section 3, we discuss the
XtreemOS trust management process and the model of trust
it is based on. In Section 4, we introduce one aspect of this
trust model, namely a user/resource mutual authentication
protocol. In Section 5, we define the formal model for this
protocol and apply a formal analysis tool to verify that the
model upholds desireable security properties, such as secrecy
of data and mutual authentication. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 7.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE XTREEMOS OP-
ERATING SYSTEM
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the main use case
motivating our work here was XtreemOS (www.xtreemos.eu)
[12, 23], an EU FP6 project, which was aimed at build-
ing a Grid-based distributed operating system that provided
a single abstraction of physical hardware and software ser-
vices offered by a collection of standalone Linux operating
systems to users within a Grid. These operating systems
could function collaboratively to support the utilization of
computational and storage resources regardless of the ge-
ographical location of their users or machines. A major
function of XtreemOS was to hide the complexity of dis-
tributed resources dynamically aggregated from large-scale
cross-domain resource providers and to ensure the trans-
parency of using such a distributed operating system. Hence,
similar to a standalone operating system, once a user is regis-
tered with XtreemOS, it should be conceptually the same to
utilise resources from any machine that the system is com-
posed of, regardless of whether such resources have been
added to the system recently or have been there before.
As illustrated in Figure 1 [12], XtreemOS is composed of
two parts: the XtreemOS foundation, called XtreemOS-F,
and high-level Grid services, called XtreemOS-G. XtreemOS-
F is a modified Linux kernel embedding support for Virtual
Organisations (VOs), where a VO in XtreemOS is a tem-
porary collaboration among various Grid resource providers
and resources for achieving a specific goal. XtreemOS-F
is a modified Linux kernel embedding VO support mecha-
nisms and providing kernel level process checkpoint/restart
functionalities. XtreemOS-G comprises several Grid OS dis-
tributed services to deal with resource and application man-
agement in VOs, and is implemented onto XtreemOS-F.
XtreemOS targets scalable and flexible management of dy-
namic VOs [11]. XtreemOS Grids spans multiple adminis-
trative domains on different sites, comprising heterogeneous
resources that can be shared by the participating organi-
sations. A Grid member can create a VO, for which he
becomes the VO owner. Any Grid member can request his
registration in a given VO, subject to the VO owner ap-
proval. Resources can be registered in VOs as well. The VO
owner defines policies stating permissions and usage rules
for VO resources. Grid administrator also defines policies
regulating what a Grid member can do (for example, per-
mission to create a VO). Resources owners in the different
administrative domains may also define local policies for re-
source usage. Grid, VO and local policies are enforced by
the XtreemOS system.
The Application Execution Management [9] services are in
charge of discovering, selecting and allocating resources for
job execution, as well as starting, controlling and monitoring
jobs. Data management in XtreemOS is achieved with the
XtreemFS Grid file system [28]. XtreemFS federates multi-
ple data stores located in different administrative domains
and provides secure access to stored files to VO members,
whatever their location.
3. TRUST MANAGEMENT IN XTREEMOS
According to Grandison and Sloman [19], trust is one as-
pect of belief in the competence of an entity to act depend-
ably, securely and reliably within a specified context. Trust
can be categorised into several classes among which are the
service provision trust and the certification trust. Service
provision trust denotes the reliance of a user on the func-
tionality of a service, which is an essential aspect of Grid-
based applications. Certification trust, on the other hand,
refers to trust built on a set of certified attributes.
Trust in XtreemOS is grounded on three main aspects.
First, trust is perceived as an administrative separation of
resource and service ownership and management. Different
organisations, resource owners, users and core XtreemOS
service managers are allocated their own domains, which
define their own boundaries of trust. This notion is based
on the notion of service provision trust. Second, trust is
asserted in special tokens created based on cryptographic
mechanisms such as digital certificates and other creden-
tials, which are then verified by their consumers. These to-
kens convey verifiable attributes of entities that allow them
to establish trust with other entities existent in other do-
mains. This aspect is similar to certification trust. Finally,
the transmission of trust tokens is achieved via trustworthy
communication channels and protocols. This final aspect is
the focus of the formal verification work presented in this
paper for one of the XtreemOS authentication protocols.
In the following sections, we give a concise overview of the
trust model and management process in XtreemOS. More
detail can be obtained from [10].
3.1 Trust Domains
Domains (or sites) refer to the separation in the ownership
and management of software and hardware resources as well
as user membership. We use the term trust domain to in-
dicate the level of assurance that each domain provides the
designers, administrators and users of the XtreemOS system
with.
In its broad definition, XtreemOS consists of three main
trust domains: Core sites, Resource sites and User sites.
Assuming that S > S′ is an assurance ordering relation
taken from some lattice of assurance levels (e.g. [13]) to
indicate that S has a higher assurance level (and is there-
fore more trustworthy) than S′, then the ordering among the
three trust domains in XtreemOS is as follows: Core Site >
Resource Site, Core Site > User Site. From this relation,
the Core site is required to be more trusted than either the
User or the Resource sites. However, no ordering exists be-
tween the User and Resource sites, since neither of these two
is assumed to be more trusted than the other in a compara-
ble manner.
The Core site is a domain in which all core security and
VO management services in XtreemOS are run. A detailed
description of these services can be found in [29]. As a re-
sult, this domain constitutes the root of trust from which
all other domains can be bootstrapped. Therefore, it is an
important requirement for the domain to have the highest
level of assurance in any XtreemOS-based Grid system.
The Core site may be split into two domains: The Core
site (oﬄine) and the Core site (online), with the ordering
Core site (oﬄine) > Core site (online). Essentially, the two
domains represent two possible operation modes of the Core
site. In the online mode, the domain is networked to other
domains and so services and applications running remotely
can access the domain and its core services. This has a
lower level of assurance than in the oﬄine case, although in
practice, it is still a requirement to maintain high levels of
assurance by adopting strong security protection measures.
Figure 1: XtreemOS Software Architecture [12].
In the oﬄine case, the domain has no network connections to
any other domains, it utilises strict security measures and its
services are only accessible via the interactions of authorised
administrators. Therefore, the domain is considered to have
the highest assurance level among all other domains.
The Resource site represents any domains in which re-
sources (machines, services, software) are hosted and are
connected to the Grid, therefore making them available to
any VOs formed out of the Grid. The level of assurance of
a resource site cannot be guaranteed. Finally, the User site
is any domain hosting users of the Grid, which may apply
to join VOs and avail of the VO resources. Like Resource
sites, User sites have no guarantees regarding their assurance
levels.
3.2 Elements of the Trust Model
We now turn our attention to the main elements constitut-
ing the XtreemOS trust model. These are shown in Figure 2,
and can be classified into four main categories: Certification
Authorities, Credentials, Users and Resources.
3.2.1 Certification Authorities
Certification authorities represent points of trust from which
users and resources can obtain credentials to certify their
identities and/or their attributes. XtreemOS defines three
such authorities: the Root Certification Authority (Root
CA), the Credential Distribution Authority (CDA) and the
Resource Certification Authority (RCA). These authorities
are organised in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 2, where
trust is delegated from the Root CA to the CDA and then
again to the RCA. This trust delegation implies that the
CDA has its public key signed by the Root CA and that
the RCA has its public key signed by the CDA. Therefore,
any entity that trusts the Root CA will also trust the CDA
and similarly then it will trust the RCA. The Root CA itself
is a self-signing authority meaning that it will sign its own
public key. An important advantage of adopting separate
authorities for users (CDAs) and resources (RCAs) is that
a clean separation of concerns could be achieved between
users’ and resources’ credential management. This implies
that the CDAs and the RCAs can easily be maintained (e.g.
upgraded or exchanged) in an independent manner as long
as the format of their certificates remains compatible with
each other.
The Root CA is the trust anchor for any XtreemOS-
based Grid system, which issues identity certificates to core
XtreemOS services. The fact that the Root CA operates as
the trust anchor means that it provides a point of reference
to the system whenever other services are compromised and
their certificates need to be reissued. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to ensure that the Root CA is highly protected from
unauthorised accesses and is running on a highly secured ma-
chine, hence it is usually operated in an oﬄine mode. This
means that any trust delegation (to the CDA) is carried
out via oﬄine means (e.g. emails, telephones, administra-
tors’ direct access using command line programs, etc.). No
network connection is provided to any services or programs
running on different machines. This is considered to provide
a higher assurance level than if the Root CA provided online
access, which would increase the risk of the Root CA being
compromised (e.g. by the theft of the Root CA’s private
key).
The CDA is a subordinate of the Root CA; the Root CA
delegates trust to the CDA. This delegation of trust means
that the CDA can certify the public keys of users and core
services such that any entity consuming the resulting cer-
tificates will be able to trace the chain of trust up to the
Root CA. The user certificate that the CDA issues also con-
tains the user’s VO attributes, such as their VO member-
ship. The CDA serves several purposes: First, it acts as the
online certificate distribution frontend to the oﬄine Root
CA. Therefore, one can achieve a separation of concerns be-
tween the management of the Root CA’s security and its
online certificate distribution functionality. The CDA also
permits the separation of functionality between user certifi-
cation, and resource certification as performed by the RCA.
To this end, the CDA delegates trust to the RCA by signing
the RCA’s public key. The CDA also acts as the authority
enabling the formation of VOs out of users and RCAs who
have been certified by a common CDA.
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Figure 2: The XtreemOS Trust Model.
Finally, the RCA is a subordinate of the CDA where the
CDA delegates trust to each RCA for the purpose of manag-
ing resource certification in its resource domain. The RCA
certifies the public keys of resources belonging to its site.
Additionally, it also issues attribute certificates required for
those resources, such as certificates stating the storage ca-
pacity, speed of processors and assurance and QoS levels of
the resource. The RCA facilitates the management of the
resource certification process within each resource site in the
Grid. It also relieves the CDA from the task of certifying
each individual resource in the Grid, which would require
information about the resource only available to its local
administrators.
3.2.2 Credentials
Digital credentials are pieces of data held by the different
entities that provide some information about them. Cre-
dentials are usually cryptographic in the form of X.509v3
certificates [21]. We call XtreemOS user certificates sim-
ply XOS-certificates, certificates issued to XtreemOS ser-
vices service certificates, and certificates issued by the RCA,
resource certificates. Certificates in XtreemOS have the fol-
lowing two forms: Identity and Attribute certificates. Iden-
tity certificates are certificates that enable their consumer to
cryptographically validate the binding between the identity
of the certificate’s holder and its public key. This binding is
important as it allows the consumer in the future to validate
the authenticity of any information signed by the certificate
holder. In XtreemOS, identity certificates are issued to all
entities in the Grid and therefore, they constitute the most
essential trust mechanism without which entities cannot par-
ticipate in VOs. On the other hand, attribute certificates are
similar to the identity certificates except that they have an
additional purpose of enumerating all the other attributes
of the entity. Such attributes may include the role of the
user in the VO or the computational power of the resource.
In XtreemOS, attribute certificates carry the attributes in
extension fields to the X.509v3 certificate format [21].
3.2.3 Users and Resources
Users are either humans or software that interact with
the XtreemOS system and utilise the Grid resources within
well-defined VOs. On the other hand, resources are the in-
dividual machines, or nodes, that offer services such as com-
putational cycles and storage space to the Grid users. A re-
sources is managed by a resource administrator, who could
also be the site administrator.
3.3 Setting-up Trust
In XtreemOS, the above trust mechanisms are set-up us-
ing a number of processes, which lead to an operational
XtreemOS Grid infrastructure out of which operational VOs
can be formed. In the following paragraphs, we describe
these processes in their order of their applicability.
3.3.1 Setting-up the Root CA certificate
The first process is to set-up the Root CA by running it
in an oﬄine non-networked machine, which is part of the
Core site. The Grid administrator will run a command line
program to generate the Root CA’s private key and self-
signed Root CA public key certificate. The Root CA’s public
certificate is then transferred to a networked machine for
distribution to all nodes in this Grid. The Root CA will
also create a certificate for the CDA.
3.3.2 Setting-up Core Services
The CDA creates service certificates for the core services.
A CDA client program running on a core service generates
the private key for that service and then uses it to sign a Cer-
tificate Signing Request (CSR), which contains the service’s
public key and other requested attributes, such as the type
of the service and some descriptive text. The type of the
service is defined by a constrained value representing any of
the XtreemOS services and is checked by the service’s clients
during a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [14] handshake. There
is an option for the CDA server to not automatically pro-
cess all or any requests for service certificates. In this case,
pending CSRs are stored in a special database for later man-
ual processing by the Grid administrator, using the CDA’s
private key to create the service certificates. This option
allows Grid administrators to apply different levels of trust
to CSRs based on the identity of the requestor.
3.3.3 The XtreemOS User Registration Process
This process represents the entry point for users who wish
to use the resources offered by a XtreemOS-enabled Grid.
It is, in some sense, a pre-authentication step to what will
follow in the next section. XtreemOS users will normally
apply for an account in an XtreemOS Grid through a Web
interface. This allows the applicant to enter their account
details (username and password) and contact details (such
as organisation and e-mail address). This process is similar
to the vetting required to join an organisation. The manual
vetting of applicants ensures that they are trustworthy to
starting using this Grid. The Grid administrator has the
option, when considering a registration request, of applying
a level of scrutiny to the registration applications appropri-
ate to the level of security and assurance required in their
Grid. Once the user has had their application approved,
they can use the Web interface to join existing VOs or to
create their own VOs.
3.3.4 The Resource Certificate Distribution Process
During this process, an RCA, R, aims at obtaining a
root certificate and an identity certificate from its associ-
ated CDA, C, through the following steps:
1. [R −→ C]: CSRR
2. [C −→ R]: (〈certR〉SKC , 〈certC〉SKC )
where in the first step, CSRR is a request for certificate
signing sent from the RCA to the CDA, 〈certR〉SKC is the
RCA’s identity certificate signed by the private key of C, and
〈certC〉SKC is a self-signed root certificate issued and signed
by C. The communication is over an SSL connection [18]
with mutual authentication. This means that communica-
tions are secret and authenticated in both directions. From
now onwards, we use the notation [A −→ Y ] to denote an
SSL-secured communication channel.
3.3.5 Machine Certification by Local RCAs
In general, machines need to register with at least one
local RCA securely. Because machines are operated within
the same administrative (trust) domain as their RCA, the
problem of establishing a secure channel between a machine
and its RCA is resolved locally within the domain. This will
depend on the level of security and assurance adopted in the
domain.
3.3.6 Obtaining a User Certificate
The final process is for the user to obtain their certifi-
cate from the CDA and start using XtreemOS Grid re-
sources. This process is the focus of the next section, which
introduces one of the many options that were considered
in XtreemOS for authenticating users and enabling trust to
be established between a user and a node belonging to an
XtreemOS VO. It is also a critical part of the trust man-
agement process, since at this point, a user will be able to
utilise resources belonging to other domains.
4. A USER/NODE MUTUAL AUTHENTICA-
TION PROTOCOL
Several protocols for authentication were proposed in the
context of establishing trust between XtreemOS users and
nodes (resources), however of these only one was formally
verified, which we discuss in this section, and which will
serve us in the next section to demonstrate an example of
the application of formal analysis tools to enhance the levels
of trust assurance in complex operating systems.
The protocol is based on the classic Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol [15]. At the end of this protocol, a
shared secret key is agreed between communicating par-
ties who (a) previously are unknown to each other; and (b)
are under two different administrative domains, who may or
may not use the same kind of authentication methods. This
protocol aims to prove a user’s identity in the context of a
VO. The following is a list of notations used in the protocol:
• U : a user within a V O
• Userid: the user’s unique identity within a V O
• V Oid: the identity of a V O that U is registered with
• N : a resource node
• V OM : a VO management authority that runs a CDA
• g, n: the Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters, where g is
the DH exponent and n is the size of the DH field
which the computation is based on.
• RY : a random number generated by entity Y
• GY : a constant where GY = gRY mod n
• GYX : a constant where GYX = (gRY mod n)RXmod n
• TY : a timestamp generated by entity Y
• KrY : the private key of entity Y
• KuY : the public key of entity Y
• 〈M〉KrY : a message M signed by Y ’s private key
• {M}KuY : a message M encrypted by Y ’s public key
• RndMsgY : a random message generated by entity Y
The mutual authentication protocol consists of the follow-
ing messages described in the classical Alice-Bob style:
1. [U → V OM ]: Userid, V Oid, g, n, GU
2. [V OM → U ]: 〈Userid, V Oid, g, n, GU , TV OM 〉 KrV OM
3. U → N : { 〈Userid, V Oid, g, n, GU , TV OM 〉KrV OM ,
RndMsgU , TU }KuN
4. N → U : GN , {RndMsgU , TU}GUN ,
{RndMsgN , TN}GUN
5. U → N : {RndMsgN , TN}GNU
The protocol commences when the user, U , in (1.) re-
quests from its home VO management authority, V OM , an
XOS certificate by submitting to VOM its user identity Uid,
the id of the VO it belongs to, Vid, the Diffie-Hellman param-
eters, g, n, and the constant GU , which the user computes
based on a fresh random number, RU , it generated. This ini-
tial message is assumed to be communicated over a mutual
SSL-secured channel shared between U and V OM , therefore
it is not possible for U to masquarade itself as someone else
to the V OM server. Once V OM receives the message, it
will check the validity of U ’s membership in the VO.
In the next message (2.), V OM replies to U also on the
same SSL connection by sending it an XOS certificate signed
by its private key, KrV OM , and carrying a timestamp, TV OM ,
denoting the expiry time of the certificate. U is then able
to use the certificate within its time validity to authenticate
itself to any node in the VO that trusts V OM and to estab-
lish a shared session with that node without. Up until now,
all communications have been assumed to run over an SSL-
secured connection. Since nodes can have varying security
communications capabilities, no such assumption is made in
the following messages between the node and the user.
In message (3.), U contacts one such node, N , over an
insecure public channel. U sends to N the certificate it
received from V OM along with a timestamped message,
RndMsgU , TU , all encrypted with the public key of the node,
KuN . This ensures that the message is fresh and that it can
only be decrypted by N . Once N receives the message, it
checks the validity of the certificate and if it is valid, it then
generates the public constant, GN , and the session key GUN .
In message (4.), N then sends to U the public constant
GN along with the original timestamped message of U en-
crypted under the session key GUN and a new timestamped
message, RndMsgN , TN generated by N and encrypted with
GUN . Upon the receipt of this message, U generates its own
copy of the session key, GNU , which is equivalent to GUN . U
then uses GNU to decrypt the two parts of the message con-
taining RndMsgU , TU and RndMsgN , TN . If RndMsgU , TU
is the same as the original and RndMsgN is fresh (i.e. TN
is recent), then N is authenticated and GNU is accepted as
the session key by U . Finally, in message (5.), U sends to
N a message, RndMsgN , TN , encrypted with its session key
GNU . N then receives this message, decrypts it, and then
checks that the pair RndMsgN , TN is the same as the orig-
inal one generated by N . If this is the case, N accepts the
authenticity of U and the use of GUN as the session key. At
the end of this step, both U and N will have authenticated
themselves and accepted GNU = GUN as their session key.
5. FORMAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF
THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the formal model and analysis
of the mutual authentication protocol between XtreemOS
users and nodes. The approach we followed was to first
define what we meant by mutual authentication. Then we
constructed a model of the protocol in a formal language
that is expressive enough to be able to capture concepts and
mechanisms used in the protocol and that is supported by
automated verification tools. Finally, we used the verifica-
tion tools to verify that the mutual authentication property
claimed by the protocol is indeed upheld in the face of ex-
ternal attackers.
Our choice of approach was mainly driven by the follow-
ing considerations, some of which were the result of require-
ments and constraints imposed by the XtreemOS project:
• The natural suitability of the input language of the
tool for modelling security protocols. Such a language
has to be message-passing and capable of expressing
security primitives (such as cryptographic functions).
• The presence of supporting tools and the degree of
automation of those tools as well as their efficiency
and natural ability in verifying security properties.
• The approach as well as the supporting tools must be
able to deal with infinite runs of the system, since secu-
rity protocols are assumed to have an infinite number
of sessions.
After considering the above different approaches, our con-
clusion was that abstract interpretation using process alge-
bra such as the pi-calculus [22] was very well suited to the
modelling of security protocols. Furthermore, this approach
is supported by one of the most efficient static analysis
tools targeted at the analysis of security protocols, namely
ProVerif [7].
5.1 A Formal Definition of Mutual Authenti-
cation
Our definition of authentication is based on the type (3)
authentication as specified by Lowe [26, §3.3]. In this type,
two entities, a and b can mutually authenticate themselves
and agree on additional information specific to the protocol
session if each is convinced that the other entity has par-
ticipated in the run and that the information exchanged is
the same. This is achieved using the concept of commit and
running events. The commit-running events provide a mech-
anism to ensure the temporal ordering of protocol steps in a
manner leading to (mutual) authentication. The occurrence
of a commit event in b must imply that the running event
in a has already occurred. This means that b has authen-
ticated a. The opposite authenticates b to a. The commit
event must happen after the end of the protocol, whereas
the running event can happen at anytime during the proto-
col but must happen before it is over. More formally, it is
possible to define one-way authentication as follows.
Definition 1 (One-Way Authentication). Given pro-
cesses, A and B, we say that A authenticates B agreeing on
M if A executes event commitA(M) and B executes event
runningB(M
′) and the following is true:
(commitA(M)⇒ runningB(M ′)) ∧ (M = M ′)
In other words, the definition of one-way authentication
states that the occurrence of runningB(M
′) precedes the
occurrence of commitA(M). Furthermore, by the time both
these events have occurred, their corresponding parameters,
M , M ′, must be the same according to some definition of
the = relation.
Now, the definition of mutual authentication is formalised
as follows, based on the definition of one-way authentication.
Definition 2 (Mutual Authentication). We say that
A and B mutually authenticate each other, if the following
holds true:
A authenticates B agreeing on M ⇔
B authenticates A agreeing on M ′
Here, it is not necessary that M = M ′, however, in session
key agreement protocols where the aim is to establish a com-
mon session key, the two values must agree if they represent
the common session key. In fact, in our analysis to follow,
this will be the case.
5.2 The Applied-pi Calculus Language
The syntax of the input language is given in Figure 3.
This syntax is based largely on a version of the pi-calculus
〈term〉 ::= 〈ident〉 | (seq〈term〉)
| 〈ident〉(seq〈term〉)
〈fact〉 ::= 〈ident〉:seq〈term〉
| 〈term〉 <> 〈term〉
| 〈term〉 = 〈term〉
〈process〉 ::= ( 〈process〉 )
| ! 〈process〉
| 0
| new 〈ident〉; 〈process〉
| if 〈fact〉 then
〈process〉 [else 〈process〉]
| in(〈term〉, 〈term〉)[; 〈process〉]
| out(〈term〉, 〈term〉)[; 〈process〉]
| let 〈term〉 = 〈term〉 in
〈process〉 [else 〈process〉]
| 〈process〉 | 〈process〉
| event 〈term〉[; 〈process〉]
Figure 3: The syntax of processes in the applied
pi-calclulus.
[22] called the applied pi-calculus [2], which extends the pi-
calculus with functional constructors/destructors and equa-
tional theories defining how constructors and destructors are
related to each other. The meaning of the syntax is de-
scribed informally as follows: A term, 〈term〉, is either an
identifier, a sequence of terms or the application of a function
to a sequence of terms. A fact, 〈fact〉, is either a predicate
applied to a sequence of terms, an inequality check of two
terms or an equality check of two terms. Using terms and
facts, a process is then defined according to the following
constructs:
• ( 〈process〉 ): a process enclosed by two brackets to
remove ambiguity.
• ! 〈process〉: a replicated process, which is capable of
spawning as many copies of itself as is required by the
context.
• 0: the null process, which is incapable of any be-
haviour.
• new 〈ident〉; 〈process〉: the process that creates a new
identifier with scope restricted to the residual process.
• if 〈fact〉 then 〈process〉 [else 〈process〉]: a process
that checks whether the specified fact is true. If so,
it chooses the then-branch. Otherwise, it proceeds as
the else-branch.
• in(〈term〉, 〈term〉)[; 〈process〉]: an input process that
receives a term over a channel name (the first indicated
term) and uses that term to replace its input parameter
(the second indicated term). It then proceeds as the
residual process. The input parameter has a scope
restricted to the residual process.
• out(〈term〉, 〈term〉)[; 〈process〉]: an output process,
which sends over a channel (the first indicated term) a
message (the second indicated term) and then proceeds
as the residual process.
• let 〈term〉 = 〈term〉 in 〈process〉 [else 〈process〉]: a let-
process, which assigns a term (the second indicated)
to another (the first indicated) with the scope of the
residual process. If the assignment fails, the let-process
proceeds as the else-process indicated at the end.
• 〈process〉 | 〈process〉: the parallel composition of two
processes, which has an interleaving semantics.
• event 〈term〉[; 〈process〉]: an event that has a name, a
possible sequence of terms that it may synchronise on
and is followed by the residual process.
For a formal semantics of the above syntax, we refer the
reader to [7] and [2].
5.3 The Formal Model of the Protocol
We define in Figure 4 a model of the mutual authentica-
tion protocol as described in Section 4 using the syntax of
the ProVerif tool. The protocol definition consists of three
process definitions: vom representing the VO management
process, p0 representing the user process and p1 representing
the node process. The protocol definition starts creating the
private and public parts of the vom process and initialises
it with the private part of the key. It also advertises the
public part over a public channel, attc, that can be read by
the attacker. It then starts initialising any number of nodes
with their private keys and with the public key of vom as
well as advertising the public key of these nodes over attc.
At the same time, the protocol process runs the node, the
user and vom processes in parallel with each other.
The vom process is ready to accept a request from a user
for an XOS certificate over a channel, vom, known only to
the vom and user processes. The request is dealt with by
sending to the user a signed certificate and then signaling us-
ing an event the termination of vom. The assumption here
is that there is a single user willing to communicate with
several nodes. The user then, after receiving the certificate,
starts a replicated process which is able to start mutually
authenticating as many nodes as available. Note the pres-
ence of the commit-running events for both the user and
node processes, which will be used to verify the success of
authentication. The specification of the protocol utilises the
following equations defining the relationship among func-
tions:
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m (1)
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m (2)
pubdec(pubenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x (3)
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x (4)
f(g(y), x) = f(g(x), y) (5)
where equations 1-3 define public-key cryptography opera-
tions, equation 4 defines secret-key cryptography and equa-
tion 5 defines the Diffie-Hellman pair of functions. This rep-
resentation of the Diffie-Hellman functions in this manner is
popular in process-algebraic-based protocol definitions [1, 7]
and it’s motivated by the analysis algorithms. Essentially,
g(RY ) = GY and f(GY , RX) = GYX in terms of the GY and
GYX defined in Section 4. The user process, however, also
passes to the vom process the Diffie-Hellman parameters,
DHexp and DHfld, as numbers representing the exponent
and the field size. This is included to model faithfully the
protocol description.
(* The VOM Process Definition *)
let vom =
(* Get initialised with the VOM private key *)
in(tvom, skV OM0);
(* Receive a Xcert request from a user *)
in(vom, (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5));
(* Check that the user’s name is u - (identification abstraction) *)
if v1=u then
(* Send user’s Xcert signed by VOM’s private key and timestamped *)
out(vom, sign((v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, Tvom), skV OM0))
(* The User Process Definition *)
let p0 =
(* Create a new user random number *)
new Ru;
(* Request an XCert from the VOM *)
out(vom, (u, vid,DHexp,DHfld, g(Ru)));
in(vom, xcert);
!(
(* Get initialised with a node’s name and public key *)
in(tu, (nv, pkN0));
(* Create a new message *)
new MSGu;
(* Contact the node and wait for the response *)
out(nv, pubenc((xcert,MSGu, Tu), pkN0));
in(u, (m1,m2,m3));
(* Generate the session key *)
let ku = f(m1, Ru) in
(* Decrypt the node messages using the session key *)
let m4=dec(m2, ku) in
let m5=dec(m3, ku) in
(* Check that the message returned by the node is the same one
sent by the user *)
(* If so, signal a running event *)
if m4 = (MSGu, Tu) then event p0running(f(g(Rn), Ru));
(* Send to the node its own message back and
signal a commit event agreeing on the session key *)
out(nv,m3);event p0commit(f(g(Rn), Ru)))
(* The Node Process Definition *)
let p1 = !(
(* Initialise the node with its private key and the VOM public key *)
in(tn, (skN1, pkV OM1));
(* Receive a request from the user *)
in(nv, x);
(* Decrypt message sent by user using the node’s private key *)
let (x0, x1, x11) = pubdec(x, skN1) in
(* Verify XCert signed by VOM using the latter’s public key *)
let (x2, x3, x4, x5, x55, x555) = checksign(x0, pkV OM1) in
(* Check that VO id is correct and that timestamp is fresh *)
if x3 = vid then if x4 = DHexp then
if x5 = DHfld then if x555 = Tvom then
(* Create a new random number and message *)
new Rn; new MSGn;
(* Create the session key signal the running event agreeing on
the session key *)
let kn = f(x55, Rn) in event p1running(f(g(Ru), Rn));
(* Send message to the user including g(Rn) *)
out(x2, (g(Rn), enc((x1, x11), kn), enc((MSGn, Tn), kn)));
(* Receive the reply from the user *)
in (nv, x6);
(* Decrypt the message *)
let x7 = dec(x6, kn) in
(* Check that received message is the same as original one sent *)
(* If so, signal the commit event agreeing on the session key *)
if x7 = MSGn then event p1commit(f(g(Ru), Rn)))
(* The Protocol Definition *)
(* Create secure private channel names *)
new tvom; new vom; new tn; new tu; (
(* Create private/public key pair for VOM *)
new skV OM; let pkV OM = pk(skV OM) in
(* Initialise VOM with its private key and advertise its public key *)
out(tvom, skV OM); out(attc, pkV OM);
(* Initialise as many nodes with their private key and VOM’s public key *)
(* Advertise the node’s public key and initialise the user with
the node’s public key *)
!(new skN;
let pkN = pk(skN) in out(attc, pkN);
(out(tn, (skN, pkV OM)) | out(tu, (n, pkN)))))
(* Run the node, the user and the VOM process concurrently *)
(* The attacker is listening on channel attc *)
| (p1) | (p0) | (vom) | (!(in(attc, v)))
Figure 4: The applied pi-calculus model of the XtreemOS mutual authentication protocol.
5.4 The Data Leakage Analysis
The first analysis of the XtreemOS mutual authentication
protocol using the ProVerif tool was carried out to determine
which data terms can possibly be leaked to the external
attacker. The results of the analysis are given in Figure 5.
Terms Leaked
pkN , pkV OM , DHexp, DHfld, u, vid, nv, attc,
g(Rn)
Terms Not Leaked
Ru, Rn, f(g(Ru), Rn), f(g(Rn), Ru), g(Ru), MSGu,
MSGn, skN , skV OM , Tu, Tn, Tvom, tu, tn, vom,
tvom
Figure 5: Leakage analysis for the XtreemOS mutual
authentication protocol.
From these results, it is clear that the attacker was not
able to construct or capture the session key, f(g(Ru), Rn),
which is the same as f(g(Rn), Ru) nor indeed any of the
terms that need to be kept secret such as the random num-
bers generated by the user and the node, Ru, Rn, the pri-
vate keys of the node and VOM, skN , skV OM , and the
exchanged messages generated by the user and the node,
MSGu, MSGn.
On the other hand, the analysis reveals that the attacker
is able to capture the term, g(Rn), which is a representa-
tion of GN in the protocol’s Alice-Bob description of Sec-
tion 4 and which is sent in the clear by the node back to
the user. This implies that the attacker may be able to
guess the value of the random number Rn if the node did
not choose a sufficiently large Rn (in the order of 100 digits
long). Similarly, the attacker may also guess the value of the
session key f(g(Rn), Ru) given Rn, if the user did not man-
age to choose a sufficiently large random number Ru. Apart
from that, the attacker’s knowledge is confined to the public
knowledge of the names pkN , pkV OM , DHexp, DHfld, u,
vid, nv and attc.
We note that the attacker is unable to capture g(Ru) gen-
erated by the user, even though this term is sent on the clear
initially to the VOM. This is due to the fact that the vom
channel is declared as a secure channel using the restriction
(new vom) in the definition of the protocol. Even though in
the model, such channels are possible to describe, in reality,
one cannot assume that there are channels secure by their
nature. Therefore, our model is somehow unrealistic in that
it assumes the existence of such naturally secure channels.
One alternative to move away from this assumption would
be to use encryption for initial communication between the
use and VOM. In that case, it would be possible to send the
message (including g(Ru)) over an insecure public channel.
5.5 The Mutual Authentication Analysis
For the second analysis, we wanted to verify the mu-
tual authentication property for the protocol using commit-
running events. The ProVerif tool was able to prove that
the following two implications are true in the case of passive
attackers:
p1commit(f(x55, Rn)) ⇒ p0running(f(m1, Ru)) (6)
p0commit(f(m1, Ru)) ⇒ p1running(f(x55, Rn)) (7)
Where x55 is a term instantiated to g(Ru) and m1 is a term
instantiated to g(Rn). According to the equation f(g(x), y) =
f(g(y), x), we can infer that f(x55, Rn) = f(m1, Ru) in
both cases, therefore we can say that the above result satis-
fies the definition of mutual authentication (Section 5.1) for
both the node and the user in the case of passive attackers.
However, when running the tool for the case of an active
attacker (e.g. Dolev-Yao [16]), we found that (6) does not
hold. This is simply becuse it is possible for U to abort once
N sends message 4, and this message is then intercepted by
the attacker who can replay the second part of message 4
back to N . Since GUN = GNU , N will incorrectly conclude
that U is still alive (and authentic), therefore violating the
definition of (6) above.
6. DISCUSSION ON THE PROTOCOL VER-
IFICATION
Technically, we found that the modelling of the XtreemOS
mutual authentication protocol was naturally straightfor-
ward in the message-passing process algebra due to the simi-
larity in the nature of the protocol and the process algebraic
language. The existence of an automatic and efficient verifi-
cation tool backed up by a formal theory (in the style of Horn
clauses [20]) facilitated the task of verifying security proper-
ties such as data leakage and mutual authentication related
to our protocol. Both the data leakage and the mutual au-
thentication analyses revealed expected results for the case
of passive attackers. One recommendation is related to the
fact that some of the data terms, such as g(Rn), are sent
on the clear and captured by the attacker. This requires
that the user and the node must choose large random num-
bers, Rn, Ru, in order to prevent the attacker from guessing
the session key. This is a well-known requirement in Diffie-
Hellman-based protocols that reveal some of the protocol-
generated data on the clear. In the case of active attackers,
authentication of users is not possible due to replay attacks,
which is also expected as a result of the communication of
some messages in the clear.
Since security protocols are often specified using infor-
mal Alice/Bob-style notation (as was the case in the origi-
nal specification of the protocol in Section 4), and despite
the fact that this is usually sufficient for giving a reason-
able description of the exchange of messages between the
different agents involved in the protocol, it does not pro-
vide any detail or formal grounds for reasoning about the
internal behaviour of those agents. Such internal behaviour
is necessary to determine whether the agent maintains its
protocol obligations, such as non-leakage of session keys and
the verification of digital signatures. The modelling exercise
here provided necessary detail in the protocol’s specification,
which was missing from the original Alice/Bob-style speci-
fication to be able to reason about the protocol’s properties
using formal analysis tools.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented in this paper a case study in the application
of formal modelling and verification techniques using process
algebra and associated tools to enhance the assurance of a
mutual authentication protocol, part of the trust model for
a large-scale distributed operating system for Grids called
XtreemOS. The modelling itself enabled the protocol as well
as the trust model to be better specified thus providing valu-
able guidance for the later design stage of the XtreemOS
system. We plan to utilise the expertise gained in this ex-
ercise to model and verify future protocols in the context of
complex distributed systems.
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